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More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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