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Informing the Public About a Pandemic

Author

Listed:
  • Francis de Véricourt

    (European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 10178 , Germany)

  • Huseyin Gurkan

    (European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 10178 , Germany)

  • Shouqiang Wang

    (Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080)

Abstract

This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease’s economic impact on the population, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis de Véricourt & Huseyin Gurkan & Shouqiang Wang, 2021. "Informing the Public About a Pandemic," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6350-6357, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:10:p:6350-6357
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4016
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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