Gig Economy: A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Botond Kőszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2006.
"A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1133-1165.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 0407001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Koszegi, Botond & Rabin, Matthew, 2004. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0w82b6nm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000341, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017.
"Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning,"
Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2006-2065.
- Jianfeng Yu & Bin Wei & Zhiguo He, 2012. "Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning," 2012 Meeting Papers 221, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Feng Gao & Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2016. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- David de Meza & David C. Webb, 2007.
"Incentive Design under Loss Aversion,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(1), pages 66-92, March.
- de Meza, David & Webb, David C., 2006. "Incentive design under loss aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24523, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David De Meza & David C Webb, 2006. "Incentive Design under Loss Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp571, Financial Markets Group.
- Evan Rawley & Timothy S. Simcoe, 2010. "Diversification, Diseconomies of Scope, and Vertical Contracting: Evidence from the Taxicab Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(9), pages 1534-1550, September.
- Kuhn, Kristine M., 2016. "The Rise of the â€œGig Economyâ€ and Implications for Understanding Work and Workers," Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 157-162, March.
- James Otto & Craig Andrews & Fred Cawood & Michael Doggett & Pietro Guj & Frank Stermole & John Stermole & John Tilton, 2006. "Mining Royalties : A Global Study of Their Impact on Investors, Government, and Civil Society," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7105, June.
- Gerald Friedman, 2014. "Workers without employers: shadow corporations and the rise of the gig economy," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 171-188, April.
- Heinkel, Robert & Stoughton, Neal M, 1994. "The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 351-387.
- James Otto & Craig Andrews & Fred Cawood & Michael Doggett & Pietro Guj & Frank Stermole & John Stermole & John Tilton, 2006. "Mining Royalties : A Global Study of Their Impact on Investors, Government, and Civil Society, Appendixes," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7136, June.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1985. "Delegated portfolio management," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, June.
- Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, 2007. "Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1047-1073, September.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
- Yuliy Sannikov, 2008. "A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 957-984.
- Hao Zhang & Stefanos Zenios, 2008. "A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(3), pages 681-696, June.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2019-03-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-UPT-2019-03-04 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1902.10021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (arXiv administrators). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.