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Goal-oriented agents in a market

Author

Listed:
  • Inés Macho-Stadler

    (UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

  • David Pérez-Castrillo

    (UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

  • Nicolas Quérou

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement)

Abstract

We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goaloriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2021. "Goal-oriented agents in a market," Post-Print hal-03214933, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03214933
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03214933v1
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    Cited by:

    1. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2022. "The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Liu, Qianshuo, 2024. "Pharmaceutical innovation collaboration, evaluation, and matching," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    3. Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2022. "Short run reference points and long run performance. (No) Evidence from running data," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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