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Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille : une revue de littérature


  • Raphaëlle Bellando


This paper surveys the literature on the agency problem in portfolio management delegation. The fact that there is no optimal contract in this case is well-documented. More recent papers have shown that this problem can be solved by adding to the contract some management constraints. However some empirical studies about implicit incentives demonstrate the convexity of the manager’s compensation, due to an asymmetric flow-performance relationship. Finally, we review empirical work about two important consequences of this agency problem: herding and excessive risk taking.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaëlle Bellando, 2008. "Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille : une revue de littérature," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(3), pages 317-339.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_183_0317

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Xavier Mahieux, 2010. "La gestion déléguée dans les fonds de capital-investissement : relation d’agence et clauses contractuelles des fonds," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 97(2), pages 253-274.
    2. Raphaëlle BELLANDO & Sébastien RINGUEDE, 2009. "Compétition entre fonds et prise de risque excessive : une application empirique au cas français," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 332, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    3. Françoise LE QUERE, 2008. "Gestion déléguée des encours par les investisseurs institutionnels : description et évolution des pratiques," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 682, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.


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