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Compensation, Career Concerns, and Relative Risk Choices by Mutual Fund Managers: Theory and Evidence

  • Ping Hu
  • Jayant Kale
  • Ajay Subramanian

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000349.

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Date of creation: 10 Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000349
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  1. Badrinath, S G & Kale, Jayant R & Noe, Thomas H, 1995. "Of Shepherds, Sheep, and the Cross-autocorrelations in Equity Returns," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 401-30.
  2. Busse, Jeffrey A., 2001. "Another Look at Mutual Fund Tournaments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(01), pages 53-73, March.
  3. Huberman, Gur & Kandel, Shmuel, 1993. "On the incentives for money managers : A signalling approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1065-1081, June.
  4. Heinkel, Robert & Stoughton, Neal M, 1994. "The Dynamics of Portfolio Management Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 351-87.
  5. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, . "Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 21-88, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  6. Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, 2000. "The determinants of the flow of funds of managed portfolios: mutual funds versus pension funds," FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2000-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  7. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1998. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 6394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, 2002. "Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets," NBER Working Papers 9275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 1998. "On the Regulation of Fee Structures in Mutual Funds," NBER Working Papers 6639, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Huddart, Steven, 1999. "Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 227-271, August.
  11. Goetzmann, William N & Peles, Nadav, 1997. "Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 145-58, Summer.
  12. Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  13. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. " Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
  14. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
  15. Elton, Edwin J & Gruber, Martin J & Blake, Christopher R, 1996. "Survivorship Bias and Mutual Fund Performance," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(4), pages 1097-1120.
  16. Hui Ou-Yang, 2003. "Optimal Contracts in a Continuous-Time Delegated Portfolio Management Problem," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 173-208.
  17. Starks, Laura T., 1987. "Performance Incentive Fees: An Agency Theoretic Approach," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(01), pages 17-32, March.
  18. Khorana, Ajay, 1996. "Top management turnover An empirical investigation of mutual fund managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 403-427, March.
  19. Fama, Eugene F & MacBeth, James D, 1973. "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 607-36, May-June.
  20. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October.
  21. Ippolito, Richard A, 1992. "Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 45-70, April.
  22. Chen, Hsiu-lang & Pennacchi, George G., 2009. "Does Prior Performance Affect a Mutual Fund’s Choice of Risk? Theory and Further Empirical Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(04), pages 745-775, August.
  23. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, 1998. "Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1589-1622, October.
  24. Taylor, Jonathan, 2003. "Risk-taking behavior in mutual fund tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 373-383, March.
  25. Jennifer Carpenter, 1999. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-076, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  26. Mark Grinblatt & Sheridan Titman, 1989. "Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(7), pages 807-822, July.
  27. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
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