Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game
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More about this item
KeywordsJapanese-English auctions ; wallet game ; discrete bids; partitions ; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium. JEL classification numbers: C72 ; D44;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DES-2017-08-06 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2017-08-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2017-08-06 (Microeconomics)
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