Hiding Information in Open Auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 771-791, September.
- Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
- Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, September.
- Christopher Avery, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016.
"Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 173-186, September.
- David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2015. "Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp537, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Creating a winner's curse via jump bids," Post-Print hal-01432861, HAL.
- Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 34, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/15048 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ray, Indrajit & Gonçalves, Ricardo, 2016. "Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2016/13, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
More about this item
Keywordsauctions; efficiency; jump bids;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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