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David Ettinger

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ettinger
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pet9
Terminal Degree:2002 (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/

:

Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cédex 16
RePEc:edi:cerp9fr (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Laboratoire d'Économie de Dauphine (LEDa)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

Paris, France
http://leda.dauphine.fr/

:


RePEc:edi:ledaufr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Sara Biancini & David Ettinger, 2016. "Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion," CESifo Working Paper Series 5933, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2015. "Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp537, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  3. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2012. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp469, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  4. Arnaud Dragicevic & David Ettinger, 2011. "Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00704708, HAL.
  5. David Ettinger, 2010. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information," Post-Print hal-00701295, HAL.
  6. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00701286, HAL.
  7. Arnaud Dragicevic & David Ettinger, 2010. "Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms / Evaluation privée d'un bien public dans trois mécanismes d'enchères," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-04, CIRANO.
  8. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Post-Print hal-00702428, HAL.
  9. David Ettinger, 2008. "Privatisation des sociétés d'autoroute et marché aval," Post-Print hal-00702431, HAL.
  10. David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Post-Print hal-00701303, HAL.
  11. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. David Ettinger, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Post-Print hal-00702434, HAL.
  13. David Ettinger, 2003. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies," Working Papers 2003.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

Articles

  1. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 173-186, September.
  2. Dragicevic Arnaud Z. & Ettinger David, 2011. "Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-29, April.
  3. David Ettinger, 2010. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 365-385, June.
  4. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
  5. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 103-124, March.
  6. David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and Shareholdings," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 90, pages 233-257.
  7. David Ettinger, 2008. "Privatisation des sociétés d'autoroute et marché aval," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 89, pages 63-90.
  8. Ettinger, David, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 1-7, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2015. "Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp537, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    Cited by:

    1. Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 34, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.

  2. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2012. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp469, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    Cited by:

    1. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Creating a winner's curse via jump bids," Post-Print hal-01432861, HAL.
    2. Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 34, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    3. Ray, Indrajit & Gonçalves, Ricardo, 2016. "Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2016/13, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.

  3. David Ettinger, 2010. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information," Post-Print hal-00701295, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Paul Madden & Mario Pezzino, 2013. "Sports League Quality, Broadcaster TV Rights Bids and Wholesale Regulation of Sports Channels," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1304, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    2. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," Working Paper Series in Economics 45, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.

  4. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00701286, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Christoph March, 2016. "Adaptive Social Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series 5783, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    3. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2009. "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1484-1507, September.
    4. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
    5. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000304, David K. Levine.
    7. Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel & Tom Rutter, 2011. "Feedback Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations. A Multi-Game Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00754551, HAL.
    8. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_04.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    10. Nick Vikander, 2014. "Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior," Discussion Papers 14-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    11. Ran Spiegler, 2017. "“Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1818-1841.

  5. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Post-Print hal-00702428, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
    2. Iryna Banakh & Taras Banakh & Pavel Trisch & Myroslava Vovk, 2012. "Toehold Purchase Problem: A comparative analysis of two strategies," Papers 1204.2065, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2014.
    3. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 111-120.

  6. David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Post-Print hal-00701303, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Silvester van Koten, 2006. "Bidding Behavior when One Bidder and the Auctioneer Are Vertically Integrated Implications for the Partial Deregulation of EU Electricity Markets," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp313, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. David Ettinger, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Post-Print hal-00702434, HAL.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," ECON - Working Papers 225, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Silvester van Koten, 2011. "Merchant interconnector projects by generators in the EU: Effects on profitability and allocation of capacity," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/10, European University Institute.
    6. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
    7. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Post-Print hal-00702428, HAL.
    8. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4771, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 111-120.
    10. Bagwell,K. & Mavroidis,P.C. & Staiger,R.W., 2003. "The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO," Working papers 14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    11. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "Optimal takeover contests with toeholds," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    12. Bagwell, Kyle & Mavroidis, Petros C. & Staiger, Robert W., 2004. "The case for tradable remedies in WTO dispute settlement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3314, The World Bank.

  7. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," Post-Print halshs-00754541, HAL.
    2. Jihong Lee, 2007. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0717, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    3. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.

  8. David Ettinger, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Post-Print hal-00702434, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper G. de, 2009. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," ECON - Working Papers 225, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Konrad, Kai Andreas, 2005. "Silent interests and all-pay auctions
      [Verborgene Interessen und "All-Pay" Auktionen Befinden sich Firmen im Wettkampf in "All-Pay" Auktionen]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2003. "Auctions with Financial Externalities," Working Papers 2003.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4771, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. David Ettinger, 2010. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information," Post-Print hal-00701295, HAL.
    7. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.
    8. Lu, Jingfeng, 2012. "Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 561-575.

  9. David Ettinger, 2003. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies," Working Papers 2003.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin, 2012. "Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities," MPRA Paper 47060, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Olivier Bos, 2010. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," Working Paper Series in Economics 45, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    3. Konrad, Kai Andreas, 2005. "Silent interests and all-pay auctions
      [Verborgene Interessen und "All-Pay" Auktionen Befinden sich Firmen im Wettkampf in "All-Pay" Auktionen]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

Articles

  1. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 173-186, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. David Ettinger, 2010. "Bidding among Friends and Enemies with Symmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 365-385, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 103-124, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and Shareholdings," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 90, pages 233-257.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Ettinger, David, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 1-7, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2004-09-12 2015-05-02 2016-06-14
  2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2016-06-14
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2016-06-14
  4. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2004-07-04
  5. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2016-06-14
  6. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2016-06-14
  7. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2007-07-13

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