A Theory of Deception
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the fundamental attribution error. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2 (1), pp.1-20. <10.1257/mic.2.1.1>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00701286|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Schwartzstein, Joshua, 2008.
"Coarse Thinking and Persuasion,"
11022284, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium,"
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995.
"Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
103, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2003.
666156000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2007. "Valuation Equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00754229, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2003. "Valuation Equilibria," Game Theory and Information 0310003, EconWPA.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2006. "Valuation Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000111, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-91, September.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
- Jeheil Phillippe, 1995. "Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 497-519, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00701286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.