A Theory of Deception
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.1.1
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- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00701286, HAL.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00701286, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011.
"Bayesian Persuasion,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000369, www.najecon.org.
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- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014.
"Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs,"
Center for Economic Research (RECent)
102, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_04.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Spiegler, Ran, 2018. "News and Archival Information in Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 12805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012.
"Reputation with Analogical Reasoning,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1927-1969.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000304, David K. Levine.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813043, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00813043, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," Post-Print hal-00813043, HAL.
- Christoph March, 2011.
"Adaptive social learning,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-00572528, HAL.
- Christoph March, 2016. "Adaptive Social Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series 5783, CESifo.
- Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.
- Marco Serena, 2019. "A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, September.
- Jehiel, Philippe, 2011.
"Manipulative auction design,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Manipulative Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001547, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754541, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," Post-Print halshs-00754541, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019.
"Partial Language Competence,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
halshs-01988076, HAL.
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2019-08, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Working Papers halshs-01988076, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," Sciences Po publications 2019-08, Sciences Po.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2019. "Partial Language Competence," PSE Working Papers halshs-01988076, HAL.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2009.
"Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1484-1507, September.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2008. "Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values," Working Papers 0801, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vikander Nick, 2019.
"Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, January.
- Nick Vikander, 2014. "Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior," Discussion Papers 14-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018.
"Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2128, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018. "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2128R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2019.
- Ran Spiegler, 2016.
"Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
- Spiegler, Ran, 2014. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Spiegler, Ran, 2014. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275828, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Ran Spiegler, 2014. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," Discussion Papers 1417, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
- Spiegler, Ran, 2014. "Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 57994, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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"The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
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Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 678-694, April.
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- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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"Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 351-365, March.
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- Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel & Tom Rutter, 2011. "Feedback Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations. A Multi-Game Experiment," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754551, HAL.
- Sobel, Joel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0015j574, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020. "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 105-121.
- Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2010.
"Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 199-223, April.
- Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2008. "Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0807, School of Economics, University of Kent.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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