Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Gopal Das Varma, 2002. "Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 689-708, Winter.
- Reynolds, Robert J. & Snapp, Bruce R., 1986. "The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 141-153, June.
- David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Post-Print hal-00701303, HAL.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:90:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
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