The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35
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- Peter Cramton & Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, 2008. "The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35," Papers of Peter Cramton 08ibsaa, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
References listed on IDEAS
- Werden, G.J. & G.J. & Froeb, L.M., 1995. "Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries," Papers 95-02, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, September.
- Jeremy T. Fox & Patrick Bajari, 2013.
"Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 100-146, February.
- Patrick Bajari & Jeremy T. Fox, 2005. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction," NBER Working Papers 11671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Salop, Steven C., 1986. "Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 155-175, June.
- repec:reg:rpubli:293 is not listed on IDEAS
- Reynolds, Robert J. & Snapp, Bruce R., 1986. "The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 141-153, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bajari, Patrick & Yeo, Jungwon, 2009. "Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 90-100, June.
More about this item
KeywordsTelecommunications Spectrum auction Bidding fronts Designated entity;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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