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Using spectrum allocations to address indigenous rights claims: The case of New Zealand

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  • Howell, Bronwyn
  • Tang, Xin

Abstract

In February 2022, the New Zealand Government announced that a yet-to-be-formed “Māori Spectrum Entity” would “receive an ongoing allocation of 20 percent of future national commercial spectrum allocations, at no cost.” This is in addition to the 25 percent of spectrum designated for 5G technology (mid-band, 3.4–3.8 GHz) under the Māori Spectrum Working Group agreement. The novel arrangement, which creates a perpetual obligation rather than simply a one-off transfer, appears to settle a long-standing dispute between the Māori indigenous people of New Zealand and the Government regarding a claim under an 1840 treaty that Māori were entitled to a share of spectrum due to their historic property rights and the Government's obligation to ensure that their language could flourish. Further support apparently derives from New Zealand's obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Suggested Citation

  • Howell, Bronwyn & Tang, Xin, 2023. "Using spectrum allocations to address indigenous rights claims: The case of New Zealand," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(10).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:47:y:2023:i:10:s0308596123001532
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2023.102642
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    References listed on IDEAS

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