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Using spectrum set-asides to address distributional objectives: Lessons from Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States

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  • Howell, Bronwyn E.
  • Potgieter, Petrus H.

Abstract

This paper critically examines the effectiveness of spectrum set-asides as a policy tool to address distributional objectives in telecommunications across four diverse national contexts: Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States. Spectrum allocation is a crucial factor for the provision of telecommunications services and by extension, for citizens’ participation in the digital economy. While economic theory supports auction-based allocations to maximise market efficiency, set-asides aim to facilitate access for disadvantaged groups or to stimulate competition. This study employs case studies from the selected countries to evaluate the impact of these set-asides on market efficiency, competition, and economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Howell, Bronwyn E. & Potgieter, Petrus H., 2025. "Using spectrum set-asides to address distributional objectives: Lessons from Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(5).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:49:y:2025:i:5:s0308596125000540
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2025.102957
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    References listed on IDEAS

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