Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2003, 80 (1), pp.1-7|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00702434|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- repec:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:90:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
- David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Post-Print hal-00701303, HAL.
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