Auctions with Financial Externalities
We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers' utilities depend on how much the winner pays.In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected revenue.The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous effects.We further show that a resale market does not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB.With a reserve price, we find an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price.For SPSB we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium.
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Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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