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Fair division under asymmetric information

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  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • van Damme, E.E.C., 1992. "Fair division under asymmetric information," Other publications TiSEM d0b9da55-49a5-41e6-8b53-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d0b9da55-49a5-41e6-8b53-62c918354894
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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
    5. Crawford, V. P. & Heller, W. P., 1979. "Fair division with indivisible commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 10-27, August.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    8. Lyon, Randolph M., 1986. "Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 129-152, June.
    9. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    10. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    11. Guth, Werner, 1986. "Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 283-294, June.
    12. William Samuelson, 1980. "The Object Distribution Problem Revisited," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(1), pages 85-98.
    13. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    2. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2007. "Auctions with Financial Externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(3), pages 551-574, September.
    3. Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017. "Divide and compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 100-110.

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