IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

  • Sonja Brangewitz

    ()

    (University of Paderborn)

  • Claus-Jochen Haake

    ()

    (University of Paderborn)

Registered author(s):

    In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/ciepap/WP64.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics in its series Working Papers CIE with number 64.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 29
    Date of creation: Jul 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:64
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 05251/05251/60-2108
    Phone: 05251/05251/60-2108
    Fax: 05251/60-3205
    Web page: http://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/center/cie/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(7), pages 486-502, March.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    6. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    7. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    9. Matsuo, Toshihide, 1989. "On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 189-194, October.
    10. Weidner, Frank, 1992. "The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 109-29.
    11. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    12. M. Harris & C. H. Kriebel & A. Raviv, 1982. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(6), pages 604-620, June.
    13. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(5), pages 320-334, January.
    14. Alfred Wagenhofer, 1994. "Transfer pricing under asymmetric information," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 71-103.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pdn:ciepap:64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (WP-WiWi-Info)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.