Privatisation des sociétés d'autoroute et marché aval
We analyze the privatization of highway firms, focusing both on the sale of the shares of these firms and the tenders organized by the highway firms for the maintenance of the highways network. If a public works firm buys shares of a highway firm, tenders become inefficient and the revenue of the highway firm rises. We propose allocation mechanisms for highway firms' shares which raise State's revenue and reduce downstream tenders' efficiency.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Annales d'Economie et Statistiques, 2008, 83, pp.63-90|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00702431|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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