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Visa Acquiring Plaid: A Tartan over a Killer Acquisition? Reflections on the risks of harming competition through the acquisition of startups within digital ecosystems

Author

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  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Thierry Warin

    (HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

Abstract

The applicability of the notion of killer acquisition to digital platforms has long been debated. The case of the proceedings brought by the U.S. DoJ against Visa is even more interesting insofar as it makes it possible to illustrate and discuss its different facets ranging from the notion of competition suppression to that of consolidation and extension of the dominant position. The complaint analysis also makes it possible to question inter-digital ecosystem competition and shed light on the issues related to the monitoring of acquisitions undertaken by dominant companies in the sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty & Thierry Warin, 2020. "Visa Acquiring Plaid: A Tartan over a Killer Acquisition? Reflections on the risks of harming competition through the acquisition of startups within digital ecosystems," Working Papers hal-03029746, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03029746
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers Control; Killer Acquisitions; Digital Ecosystems; Foreclosure; Damage to Innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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