Optimal Auction Design with Discrete Bidding
We develop the theory of optimal auction design in a discrete bidding model. Examples show that many of the equivalence results or other well-known results may fail in an auction with discrete bidding. We show that the optimal auciton problem, however, has a similar solution. We formulate a payoff formula which is a discrete version of the one for the continuous bidding model. We show that an optimal auction must satisfy the payoff formula, and the payoff formula is used to reduce the problem into the design of winning rules. We then use a simple algorithm and the duality theory of linear programming to build a general solution of the problem.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||May 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501|
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:592. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ryo Okui)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.