Successful Uninformed Bidding
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better informed bidders, and sometimes, even with higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of worse informed bidders and the number of units for sale. Finally we argue that the correct intuitive explanation of these results relies on the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse effects.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2001|
|Date of revision:|
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