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Do social networks prevent bank runs?

Author

Listed:
  • Alfonso Rosa García

    (Universidad de Murcia)

  • Hubert Janos Kiss

    (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

  • Ismael Rodríguez Lara

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

We develop, both theoretically and experimentally, a stereotypical environment that allows for coordination breakdown, leading to a bank run. Three depositors are located at the nodes of a network and have to decide whether to keep their funds deposited or to withdraw. One of the depositors has immediate liquidity needs, whereas the other two depositors do not. Depositors act sequentially and observe others actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a link connecting the first two depositors to decide is sufficient to avoid a bank run. However, our experimental evidence shows that subjects¿ choice is not affected by the existence of the link per se. Instead, being observed and the particular action that is observed determine subjects¿ choice. Our results highlight the importance of initial decisions in the emergence of a bank run. In particular, Bayesian analysis reveals that subjects clearly depart from predicted behavior when observing a withdrawal.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfonso Rosa García & Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez Lara, 2009. "Do social networks prevent bank runs?," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-25
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kiss, Hubert J. & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso, 2014. "Do women panic more than men? An experimental study of financial decisions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 40-51.
    2. Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez‐Lara & Alfonso Rosa‐García, 2012. "On the Effects of Deposit Insurance and Observability on Bank Runs: An Experimental Study," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(8), pages 1651-1665, December.
    3. Douglas D. Davis & Robert J. Reilly, 2016. "On Freezing Depositor Funds at Financially Distressed Banks: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(5), pages 989-1017, August.
    4. Rosa-García, Alfonso & Kiss, Hubert Janos, 2011. "Coordination structures," MPRA Paper 30463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Brown, Martin & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2012. "Contagious Bank Runs: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers on Finance 1207, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    6. Brown, Martin & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2014. "Understanding bank-run contagion," Working Paper Series 1711, European Central Bank.
    7. Dedova, M. & Pilnik, N. & Pospelov, I., 2014. "Description of Liquidity Needs on the Part of the Russian Banking System Based on the Statistics of Turnovers," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 87-109.
    8. Kiss, Hubert Janos & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Rosa-García, Alfonso, 2014. "Do social networks prevent or promote bank runs?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 87-99.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank runs; coordination failures; experimental evidence; networks;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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