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Strategic truth and deception

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Oyarzun

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Paan Jindapon

    (University of Alabama)

Abstract

We study strategic communication in a sender-receiver gamein which the sender sends a message about the observed quality ofthe good to the receiver who may accept or reject the good without knowing the true quality or the sender's type. The game has infinitely many perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium refinement identifies a unique class of equilibria that are outcome equivalent to the equilibrium in which the neutral sender always tells the truth and the biased sender adopts a feigning strategy to disguise himself by not fully exaggerating about the quality of the good.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Oyarzun & Paan Jindapon, 2009. "Strategic truth and deception," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-24
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2009-24.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

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    Cited by:

    1. Alfonso Rosa García & Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez Lara, 2009. "Do social networks prevent bank runs?," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana, 2009. "Anthropometry and Socioeconomics in the Couple: Evidence from the PSID," Working Papers 2009-22, FEDEA.
    3. Ramón Faulí-Oller, 2009. "Mergers of retailers with limited selling capacity," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Empar Pons Blasco & Luisa Escriche Bertolín, 2009. "Who moves up the career ladder? A model of gender differences in job promotion," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Aurora Gómez Galvarriato & Cesar Guerrero-Luchtenberg, 2010. "Timing of protectionism," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap Talk; Feigning Strategy; Strategic Information Transmission.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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