Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation
Under Threshold voting, voters casts ballots which include a vector of cardinal utilities (a type) and a real number (a threshold). We prove that a voter has an incentive to reveal his type: for each insincere ballot, there is a sincere ballot that the voter prefers.
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- Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015.
"Bargaining through Approval,"
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