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Crisis Initiation and Misperception

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  • Ben D. Mor

Abstract

This paper applies a theory-of-moves game model to analyze the effects of misperception on crisis initiation. The analysis indicates that the effects of misperception on initiation vary across player types and their level of dissatisfaction with the status quo: the initiation behavior of hard-line and middle-line players is adversely affected - they initiate crises they would otherwise avoid - at low and moderate levels of dissatisfaction, but not at high levels, where dissatisfaction is a sufficient condition for initiation; softline initiators, on the other hand, are nearly always adversely affected. Misperception may also result in noninitiation, which may be detrimental to satisfied players who wish to protect the status quo but beneficent to would-be targets. These conclusions, which support prior game-theoretic work, have important implications for deterrence and crisis-prevention strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben D. Mor, 1995. "Crisis Initiation and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 351-367, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:351-367
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692895007003007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams & Ben D. Mor, 1993. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 432-454, October.
    2. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
    3. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves," Working Papers 94-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa, 2016. "Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 44-53.
    2. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa & Baer-Nawrocka, Agnieszka, 2019. "Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU: Expected results and their social acceptance," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 607-622.

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