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Macedonian Border Closings in the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • John H.P. Williams

    (Department of Political Science East Carolina University Greenville, North Carolina, USA)

  • Lester A. Zeager

    (Department of Economics East Carolina University Greenville, North Carolina, USA, zeagerl@mail.ecu.edu)

Abstract

The 1999 Kosovo crisis generated more than 800,000 refugees, the majority of whom fled into Albania or Macedonia. While Albanians welcomed their ethnic kin, Macedonia closed its border three times. We provide a game-theoretic perspective on strategic interactions between Macedonia and NATO. We use narrative accounts of the crisis to eliminate many configurations of payoffs. Among those remaining, the theory of moves isolates one game that can satisfy the necessary conditions for credible threats: the prisoners' dilemma. Credible threats of border closings in a prisoners' dilemma alter donor incentives and lead to international sharing of asylum burdens in repeated play.

Suggested Citation

  • John H.P. Williams & Lester A. Zeager, 2004. "Macedonian Border Closings in the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 233-254, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:21:y:2004:i:4:p:233-254
    DOI: 10.1080/07388940490882523
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lester A. Zeager, 2002. "The Role of Strategic Threats in Refugee Resettlement," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(2), pages 159-191, May.
    2. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
    3. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.
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