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The Comparison of Four Types of Everyday Interdependencies

Author

Listed:
  • Jacob Dijkstra

    (Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, The Netherlands, j.dijkstra@ rug.nl)

  • Marcel A. L. M. van Assen

    (Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg University, Postbus 90153, Tilburg, NL-5000 LE, The Netherlands, m.a.l.m.vanassen@uvt.nl)

Abstract

Actor behavior is compared theoretically and experimentally in four well-known everyday interdependence situations; (i) the market, (ii) the tragedy of the commons or resource dilemma, (iii) the public good problem, and (iv) the household. It is shown that the four situations can be studied within one general framework of exchange networks with externalities. Core theory is generalized to exchange networks with externalities and applied to derive predictions concerning differences in behavior in the four situations. The experiments corroborate the prediction that competition is most fierce in the resource dilemma, fierce in the market, and absent in the public good problem and household.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Dijkstra & Marcel A. L. M. van Assen, 2008. "The Comparison of Four Types of Everyday Interdependencies," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(1), pages 115-143, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:115-143
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463107085435
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacob Dijkstra, 2009. "Externalities in Exchange Networks," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(4), pages 395-427, November.

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