Authority and communication in the laboratory
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006
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- Ezquerra, Lara & Kujal, Praveen, 2020. "Self-selecting into being a dictator: Distributional consequences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
- Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof, 2016. "Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-050/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
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Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 858-876, December.
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International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
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- Silvia Dominguez-Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010.
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CESifo Working Paper Series
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- Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3714-3743, June.
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American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 55-76, February.
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- Katharina Eckartz & Christiane Ehses-Friedrich, 2014. "Strategic Communication: An Experimental Investigation," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-007, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap-talk communication; Decision-making authority; Delegation; Laboratory experiment; Level-k model;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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