A Model Of Immigration, Integration And Cultural Transmission Of Social Norms
I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and culturaltransmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matchedto play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-randomdue to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers to atendency of individuals to have a higher rate of interaction with individuals oftheir type than with similar numbers of other agents. I derive a culturaltransmission mechanism in order to examine the influence of viscosity and ofother institutional characteristics of society on the evolutionary selection of prosocialnorms. The main findings are that strict norms, sustained by stronginternal punishment, need either viscosity or strong institutional pressures topersist, while norms of intermediate strength persist under a variety ofinstitutional characteristics. Endogenizing norm strength allows to identify twoscenarios in which pro-social norms survive: One of rigidity in whichseparation (high viscosity) leads to monomorphic equilibria with strict normsfor cooperation. And one of integration (low viscosity) where intermediatenorms persist in polymorphic equilibria. Furthermore, with endogenous norms,viscosity and cooperation are not linked in a monotone way.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
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