The importance of considering optimal government policy when social norms matter for the private provision of public goods
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- Guy Meunier & Ingmar Schumacher, 2020. "The importance of considering optimal government policy when social norms matter for the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 630-655, June.
- Guy Meunier & Ingmar Schumacher, 2020. "The Importance of Considering Optimal Government Policy When Social Norms Matter for the Private Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 2020-007, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
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- Rabah Amir & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 765-771, October.
- Qin, Botao & Shogren, Jason, 2023. "Endogenous Social Norms, Mechanism Design, and Payment for Environmental Services," MPRA Paper 112878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laurence Kranich, 2022. "Affective social policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 362-379, April.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Katarina Nordblom, 2022.
"Tax evasion with a conscience,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 5-29, February.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Nordblom, Katarina, 2018. "Tax Evasion with a Conscience," Working Papers in Economics 738, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Botao Qin & Jason F Shogren & Thorsten Janus, 2025. "The effects of social norm sensitivity in a PES mechanism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(2), pages 792-800.
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PBE-2017-09-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2017-09-24 (Regulation)
- NEP-SOC-2017-09-24 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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