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Evolutive Equilibrium Selection I: Symmetric Two Player Binarychoice Games

  • Richard Vaughan
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    The aim of the paper is the construction of a distributional model which enables the study of the evolutionary dynamics that arise for symmetric games, and the equilibrium selection mechanisms that originate from such processes. The evolution of probability distributions over the state variables is studied using the Fokker- Planck dif-fusion equation. Equilibrium selection using the "basin of attraction" approach, and a selection process suggested by Pontryagin are contrasted. Examples are provided for all generic 2-person symmetric binary choice games.

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    Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number 016.

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    Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:016
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    1. Binmore, K. & samuelson, L., 1996. "Muddling Through : Noisy Equilibrium Section," Working papers 9410r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    2. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994.
    3. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
    6. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    7. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
    8. van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games," Other publications TiSEM 1c09a228-43e3-48ec-ad9c-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July.
    10. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
    11. Carlsson, H. & Van Dame, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games," Papers 9170, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    12. repec:att:wimass:9324 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic replicator dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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