IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Pasquale Scaramozzino

    ()

    (University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics SOAS, University of London - Department of Financial and Management Studies)

  • Nir Vulkan

    ()

    (University of Oxford - Sa•d Business School)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of co-ordination failures based on market power and local oligopoly. The economy exhibits a multiplicity of Pareto-ranked equilibria. The introduction of uncertainty generates an endogenous equilibrium selection process, due to a strategic use of information by firms. The economy is more likely to settle on some equilibria than on others. We argue that a full understanding of these robustness criteria is needed before any policy which is intended to help co-ordinate the level of activity to a Pareto dominant outcome can be successfully implemented.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://www.ceistorvergata.it/repec/rpaper/No-05-Scaramozzino,Vulkan.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 5.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 24 Jun 2003
Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:5
Contact details of provider: Postal:
CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma

Phone: +390672595601
Fax: +39062020687
Web page: http://www.ceistorvergata.it
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
Web: http://www.ceistorvergata.it Email:


Keywords: Microfoundations; co-ordination failure; equilibrium selection;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
  • E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, July.
  2. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  3. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  4. Stephen Morris, "undated". "Co-operation and Timing," Penn CARESS Working Papers b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4eb, Penn Economics Department.
  5. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
  6. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
  7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1987. "Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 131-146, December.
  8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
  9. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
  10. Silvestre, Joaquim, 1993. "The Market-Power Foundations of Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 105-141, March.
  11. Carlsson, H. & Van Dame, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games," Papers 9170, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  12. Kim, Youngse, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 203-227, August.
  13. Dixon,Huw David & Rankin,Neil, 1995. "The New Macroeconomics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521479479, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Pasquale Scaramozzino & Jonathan Temple & Nir Vulkan, 2005. "Implementation Cycles in the New Economy," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 05/569, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Barbara Piazzi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.