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"Co-operation and Timing''

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  • Stephen Morris

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  • Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Co-operation and Timing''," CARESS Working Papres 95-05, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05
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    File URL: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/econ/CARESS/CARESSpdf/95-05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-157, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pasquale Scaramozzino & Nir Vulkan, 2004. "Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 22-40, February.
    2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, "undated". "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory," Penn CARESS Working Papers 72042421d029130510780dde2, Penn Economics Department.
    3. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Morgan, John, 2010. "Clock games: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 532-550, March.
    4. Abreu, Dilip & Brunnermeier, Markus K., 2002. "Synchronization risk and delayed arbitrage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 341-360.
    5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    6. Li, Mei & Milne, Frank, 2007. "The Role of Large Players in a Dynamic Currency Attack Game," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273624, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    7. Morris, Stephen, 2014. "Coordination, timing and common knowledge," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 306-314.
    8. Stephen Morris, "undated". "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching," Penn CARESS Working Papers 1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2, Penn Economics Department.

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