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The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law

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  • Xiudeng Zheng
  • Ross Cressman
  • Yi Tao

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  • Xiudeng Zheng & Ross Cressman & Yi Tao, 2011. "The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 462-477, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:3:p:462-477
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0025-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Morris, Stephen & Rob, Rafael & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Dominance and Belief Potential," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 145-157, January.
    3. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    4. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson & Petyon Young, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    6. Martin A. Nowak & Akira Sasaki & Christine Taylor & Drew Fudenberg, 2004. "Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 428(6983), pages 646-650, April.
    7. Sabin Lessard, 2011. "On the Robustness of the Extension of the One-Third Law of Evolution to the Multi-Player Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 408-418, September.
    8. Ross Cressman, 2009. "Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 221-247, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul F. Slade, 2019. "Dominant Cubic Coefficients of the ‘1/3-Rule’ Reduce Contest Domains," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(6), pages 1-11, May.
    2. Feng, Tian-Jiao & Fan, Song-Jia & Li, Cong & Tao, Yi & Zheng, Xiu-Deng, 2023. "Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    3. Yu, Jie-Ru & Liu, Xue-Lu & Zheng, Xiu-Deng & Tao, Yi, 2017. "Selection intensity and risk-dominant strategy: A two-strategy stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite population," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 297(C), pages 1-7.

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