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A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice

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  • Dai, Darong
  • Shen, Kunrong

Abstract

In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Dai, Darong & Shen, Kunrong, 2012. "A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice," MPRA Paper 40586, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Aug 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40586
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40586/1/MPRA_paper_40586.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stochastic replicator dynamics; Rational choice; Normal-form game; Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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