On the Robustness of the Extension of the One-Third Law of Evolution to the Multi-Player Game
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- repec:eee:thpobi:v:75:y:2009:i:4:p:266-277 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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- Chaitanya Gokhale & Arne Traulsen, 2014. "Evolutionary Multiplayer Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 468-488, December.
- repec:eee:thpobi:v:81:y:2012:i:4:p:264-272 is not listed on IDEAS
- Xiudeng Zheng & Ross Cressman & Yi Tao, 2011. "The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 462-477, September.
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KeywordsEvolutionary games; Multi-player game; One-third law of evolution; Fixation probability; Exchangeable models; Projected average excess;
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