Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games
The relationships between five stability criteria for evolutionary games are studies.
|Date of creation:||15 Dec 1996|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Letters, 1997, pages 45-50.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden|
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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- Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992.
"Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
- Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Gans, Joshua S., 1995. "Evolutionary selection of beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 13-17, July.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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