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Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach

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  • Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis
  • Xepapadeas, Anastasios

Abstract

We study the evolution of compliance and regulation of a renewable common pool resource, a fishery in particular, with appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with harvesting quotas is the result of imitation described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with a proportional fine and an endogenized probability of audit. The outcome of regulation is characterized in terms of monomorphic and polymorphic steady states with respect to compliance. Using numerical simulations stability properties are examined, and sensitivity analysis explores the effect of various parameters on polymorphic steady-state outcomes.

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  • Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 236-253.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:2:p:236-253
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2017.02.004
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    2. Halkos, George E. & Papageorgiou, George J. & Halkos, Emmanuel G. & Papageorgiou, John G., 2020. "Public debt games with corruption and tax evasion," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 250-261.
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    4. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 831-847, November.
    5. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.

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