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Evolutionary success and failure of wildlife conservancy programs


  • Esther Blanco


  • Javier Lozano



This paper develops an evolutionary bio-economic model for hunting, farming and tourism (non-consumptive and safari hunting) to study the determinants of the prosperity of conservancy programs. The model is inspired in the Conservancy program of Namibia, despite it is of more general applicability to other contexts. We explore the relevance of the design attributes of conservancy programs in their prosperity in the long-run as well as the relevance of variables of the context of application highlighted in empirical literature. In addition, we explore the welfare implications of conservancies for local communities and its compatibility with conservation objectives. We discuss the results of the conservancy model with respect to the benchmark of open access and of compensation policies for agricultural looses out of wildlife.

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  • Esther Blanco & Javier Lozano, 2012. "Evolutionary success and failure of wildlife conservancy programs," Working Papers 2012-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2012-18

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robin Naidoo & Greg Stuart-Hill & L. Weaver & Jo Tagg & Anna Davis & Andee Davidson, 2011. "Effect of Diversity of Large Wildlife Species on Financial Benefits to Local Communities in Northwest Namibia," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(2), pages 321-335, February.
    2. Bulte, Erwin H. & Horan, Richard D., 2003. "Habitat conservation, wildlife extraction and agricultural expansion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 109-127, January.
    3. Oses-Eraso, Nuria & Viladrich-Grau, Montserrat, 2007. "On the sustainability of common property resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 393-410, May.
    4. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    5. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    6. Gibson, Clark C. & Marks, Stuart A., 1995. "Transforming rural hunters into conservationists: An assessment of community-based wildlife management programs in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 941-957, June.
    7. Winkler, Ralph, 2011. "Why do ICDPs fail?: The relationship between agriculture, hunting and ecotourism in wildlife conservation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 55-78, January.
    8. Bulte, Erwin & Rondeau, Daniel, 2007. "Compensation for wildlife damages: Habitat conversion, species preservation and local welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 311-322, November.
    9. Christopher B. Barrett & Peter Arcese, 1998. "Wildlife Harvest in Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: Linking Harvest to Household Demand, Agricultural Production, and Environmental Shocks in the Serengeti," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 74(4), pages 449-465.
    10. Joïlle Noailly & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Cees A. Withagen, 2003. "Evolution of harvesting strategies: replicator and resource dynamics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 183-200, April.
    11. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    12. Swanson, Timothy M, 1994. "The Economics of Extinction Revisited and Revised: A Generalised Framework for the Analysis of the Problems of Endangered Species and Biodiversity Losses," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 800-821, Supplemen.
    13. Daniel Rondeau & Erwin Bulte, 2007. "Wildlife Damage and Agriculture: A Dynamic Analysis of Compensation Schemes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(2), pages 490-507.
    14. Schulz, Carl-Erik & Skonhoft, Anders, 1996. "Wildlife management, land-use and conflicts," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(03), pages 265-280, July.
    15. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    16. Mari Rege, 2004. "Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 65-77, February.
    17. Karolina Safarzyńska & Jeroen Bergh, 2010. "Evolutionary models in economics: a survey of methods and building blocks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 329-373, June.
    18. Bandyopadhyay, Sushenjit & Humavindu, Michael N. & Shyamsundar, Priya & Limin Wang, 2004. "Do households gain from community-based natural resource management? An evaluation of community conservancies in Namibia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3337, The World Bank.
    19. Barrett, Christopher B. & Arcese, Peter, 1995. "Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) Sustainable? On the conservation of large mammals in sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 1073-1084, July.
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    Bioeconomic modeling; Community-based management; Wildlife;

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