Further Investigations into the Factors Affecting Compliance with U.K. Fishing Quotas
This paper reports the results of a more recent study of quota compliance in the U.K. fishery that was investigated in an earlier article in this journal (Hatcher et al. 2000). The study collected more detailed data on fishermen’s perceptions and experience of enforcement and sought to measure the financial incentive to cheat. In addition, whereas the earlier study used a binary approach to modelling the data, we employed an orderedresponse model and included a number of scale regressors without transformation. Although we still find some evidence of normative influences on violation levels, the results suggest that “conventional” economic incentives predominate in the fishery.
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