Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries
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More about this item
Keywordscompliance; fishery; Lake Victoria; legitimacy; normative; deterrence;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2005-09-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-09-11 (Regulation)
- NEP-RES-2005-09-11 (Resource Economics)
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