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Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

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  • EGGERT, HÃ…KAN
  • LOKINA, RAZACK B.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance, using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from 459 Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that the decision to be either a non-violator or a violator, as well as the violation rate – if the latter – are influenced by changes in deterrence variables like the probability of detection and punishment and also by legitimacy and social variables. We also identify a small group of fishers who react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables but persistently violate the regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Eggert, Hã…Kan & Lokina, Razack B., 2010. "Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 197-217, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:15:y:2010:i:02:p:197-217_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Luomba & Ratana Chuenpagdee & Andrew M. Song, 2016. "A Bottom-Up Understanding of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Lake Victoria," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-14, October.
    2. Akpalu, Wisdom & Normanyo, Ametefee K., 2017. "Gold Mining Pollution and the Cost of Private Healthcare: The Case of Ghana," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 104-112.
    3. Eggert, HÃ¥kan & Greaker, Mads, 2009. "Effects of Global Fisheries on Developing Countries: Possibilities for Income and Threat of Depletion," RFF Working Paper Series dp-10-09-02-efd, Resources for the Future.
    4. Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2012. "Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 133-152.
    5. Akpalu, Wisdom & Eggert, Håkan & Vondolia, Godwin K., 2009. "Enforcement of exogenous environmental regulation, social disapproval and bribery," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 940-945, December.
    6. Karper, Marjoleine A.M. & Lopes, Priscila F.M., 2014. "Punishment and compliance: Exploring scenarios to improve the legitimacy of small-scale fisheries management rules on the Brazilian coast," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 457-464.
    7. Waichman, Israel & Blanckenburg, Korbinian von, 2020. "Is there no “I” in “Team”? Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect in a Cournot competition experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    8. Eggert, Håkan & Greaker, Mads & Kidane, Asmerom, 2012. "Trade and Resources: Welfare effects of the Lake Victoria fisheries boom," Working Papers in Economics 534, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Abusin, Sanaa & Hassan, Rashid, 2014. "Legitimacy and ethics or deterrence factors: Which are more important for compliance with regulations among the artisanal fishers of Sudan?," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 9(3), pages 1-14, August.
    10. C. A. Etiegni & K. Irvine & M. Kooy, 2017. "Playing by whose rules? Community norms and fisheries rules in selected beaches within Lake Victoria (Kenya) co-management," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1557-1575, August.
    11. Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, 2008. "Comparative capitalism and sustainable development: Stakeholder capitalism and co‐management in the Kenyan fisheries sub sector," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(1), pages 64-76, February.
    12. Dannenberg, Astrid & Diekert, Florian & Händel, Philipp, 2022. "The effects of social information and luck on risk behavior of small-scale fishers at Lake Victoria," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    13. Diekert, Florian & Eymess, Tillmann & Luomba, Joseph & Waichman, Israel, 2020. "The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions," Working Papers 0684, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    14. Diekert, Florian & Eymess, Tillmann & Goeschl, Timo & Gómez-Cardona, Santiago & Luomba, Joseph, 2022. "Subsidizing Compliance: A Multi-Unit Price List Mechanism for Legal Fishing Nets at Lake Victoria," Working Papers 0711, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    15. Sundström, Aksel, 2016. "Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 73-83.
    16. Epstein, Graham, 2017. "Local rulemaking, enforcement and compliance in state-owned forest commons," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 312-321.
    17. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Epstein, Graham, 2015. "The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-20.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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