Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries
This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We used self-reported data from Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicated that the decision to be a non-violator or to be a violator—as well as the violation rate—are influenced by changes in deterrence variables (such as the probability of detection and punishment), but with respect to legitimacy and social variables. We also identified a small group of fishers that reacted neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but persistently violated the regulation and used bribes to avoid punishment.
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