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Legitimacy, Local Participation, and Compliance in the Galapagos Marine Reserve

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  • Carlos Chavez
  • César Viteri

Abstract

We analyze the compliance behavior of the small-scale fishery boat-owners of the Galapagos Marine Reserve. Our empirical analysis considers aspects related to the participatory management system of the reserve as determinant factors of the decision to violate the regulations. The econometric results indicate that, along with surveillance and fines, the level of legitimacy that norms have among the boat-owners, the sense of belonging of individuals, the legitimacy of their local organizations, as well as their participation levels in these organizations are additional determinant factors in the decision to transgress the agreed regulations. Policy recommendation to improve compliance are also discussed

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Chavez & César Viteri, 2004. "Legitimacy, Local Participation, and Compliance in the Galapagos Marine Reserve," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 168, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bardhan, Pranab, 1993. "Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 633-639, April.
    4. Aaron Hatcher & Shabbar Jaffry & Olivier Thébaud & Elizabeth Bennett, 2000. "Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 76(3), pages 448-461.
    5. William J. Furlong, 1991. "The Deterrent Effect of Regulatory Enforcement in the Fishery," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(1), pages 116-129.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouma, Jetske & Ansink, Erik, 2013. "The role of legitimacy perceptions in self-restricted resource use: A framed field experiment," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 84-93.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    local participation; compliance; legitimacy; natural resource management.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection

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