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Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

Author

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  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

    () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

Abstract

The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper & Mathiesen, Christoph, 2003. "Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries lessons from Denmark," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 409-416, September.
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    13. Grieson, Ronald E. & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Regulating externalities through testing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 369-387, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Tavoni & Maja Schlüter & Simon Levin, 2010. "The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management," Working Papers 2010.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Hye, Qazi Muhammad Adnan & Tiwari, Aviral Kumar & Leitão, Nuno Carlos, 2013. "Economic growth, energy consumption, financial development, international trade and CO2 emissions in Indonesia," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 109-121.
    3. Esther Blanco & Javier Lozano, 2015. "Ecolabels, uncertified abatement, and the sustainability of natural resources: an evolutionary approach," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 623-647, July.
    4. repec:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:2:p:236-253 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2008. "Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0811, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    6. Muhammad, Shahbaz, 2012. "Multivariate granger causality between CO2 Emissions, energy intensity, financial development and economic growth: evidence from Portugal," MPRA Paper 37774, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Mar 2012.
    7. Lamantia, F. & Radi, D., 2015. "Exploitation of renewable resources with differentiated technologies: An evolutionary analysis," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 155-174.
    8. Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 236-253.
    9. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Muhammad, Shahbaz Shabbir, 2011. "Environmental Kuznets Curve and the role of energy consumption in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 34929, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Nov 2011.
    10. Eftichios S. Sartzetakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Athanasios Yannacopoulos, 2015. "Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework," Working Papers 2015.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Shabbir, Muhammad Shahbaz, 2012. "Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis in Pakistan: Cointegration and Granger causality," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 2947-2953.
    12. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Adebola Solarin, Solarin & Ozturk, Ilhan, 2016. "Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and the role of globalization in selected African countries," MPRA Paper 69859, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Mar 2016.
    13. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    14. Muhammad, Shahbaz & Faridul, Islam & Muhammad Sabihuddin, Butt, 2011. "Financial Development, Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions: Evidence from ARDL Approach for Pakistan," MPRA Paper 30138, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Apr 2011.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common pool resources (CPR); harvesting; regulation; replicator dynamics; compliance;

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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