Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources
The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +30 831 77405
Fax: +30 831 77406
Web page: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Devon Garvie & Andrew Keeler, 1993.
"Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice,"
873, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
- Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
- Franckx, Laurent, 2002.
"The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.
- Laurent Franckx, 1998. "The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces9835, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
- Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
- Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper & Mathiesen, Christoph, 2003. "Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries lessons from Denmark," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 409-416, September.
- Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
- Grieson, Ronald E. & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Regulating externalities through testing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 369-387, April.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
- Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
- Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1971. "Economics of Production from Natural Resources: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 488-91, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kostis Pigounakis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.