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Mechanism Design For Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information

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  • Johansson, Robert C.

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to evaluate first- and second-best trading mechanisms for regulating point and nonpoint source phosphorus emissions. The trading mechanisms are differentiated on the degree to which regulators can observe abatement efforts. The deadweight losses attributable to informational asymmetries and those of the second-best mechanisms will provide regulators the shadow value of foregoing first-best measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson, Robert C., 2001. "Mechanism Design For Nutrient Trading Under Asymmetric Information," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20558, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20558
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20558
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    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20558/files/sp01jo01.pdf
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    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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