Regulation of Farming Activities: An Evolutionary Approach
Farming activity is modeled under an intervention policy regime, combining the environmental requirements of the Council Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) and the compensatory provisions of the second pillar of the Common Agricul- tural Policy. The optimizing behavioural rule along with the evolutionary rule is employed in order to model the individual farmer's decision making, regard- ing compliance or not with regulatory provisions. The impact of these di¤erent behavioral rules on the selection of monitoring effort and thus on the compli- ance incentives of a population of farmers is examined. Analysis indicated that if monitoring effort is chosen arbitrarily or optimally based on the accustomed full rationality assumption then the population adopts a monomorphic behav- ior in the long-run, involving either full or noncompliance with the Directive's provisions. A polymorphic behavior involving partial compliance of the pop- ulation also arises if the dynamic model of optimal monitoring is constrained by replicator dynamics which represent the imitation rules. It is evident, thus, that the number and the type of the equilibrium steady-states is affected by the assumption regarding the behavioral rule adopted by regulated agents. Fi- nally, the dynamics of the population of compliant farmers is also assessed under accumulation of monitoring capital indicating identical properties.
|Date of creation:||10 Jun 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Gallos - Rethymno 74100|
Phone: +30 831 77405
Fax: +30 831 77406
Web page: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anastasios Xepapadeas, .
"Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources,"
0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, 09.
- LaFrance, Jeffrey T. & Barney, L. Dwayne, 1991. "The envelope theorem in dynamic optimization," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 355-385, April.
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995.
"Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March.
- Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Observability And Choice Of Instrument Mix In The Control Of Externalities," Working Papers 9401, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
- Fleming, R. A. & Adams, R. M., 1997. "The Importance of Site-Specific Information in the Design of Policies to Control Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 347-358, July.
- Murat Isik, 2004. "Incentives for Technology Adoption Under Environmental Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Green Payment Programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(3), pages 247-263, March.
- Feinstein, C. D. & Oren, S. S., 1983. "Local stability properties of the modified Hamiltonian dynamic system," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 387-397, September.
- Underwood, Nora A. & Caputo, Michael R., 1996. "Environmental and Agricultural Policy Effects on Information Acquisition and Input Choice," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 198-218, September.
- Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.
- Caputo, Michael R., 1990. "How to do comparative dynamics on the back of an envelope in optimal control theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 655-683, October.
- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy, adjustment costs, and behavior of the firm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 258-275, November.
- Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
- Laukkanen, Marita & Huhtala, Anni, 2005. "Optimal Control of Nutrient Pollution in a Coastal Ecosystem: Agricultural Abatement versus Investment in Wastewater Treatment Capacity," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24451, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Langpap, Christian & Wu, JunJie, 2004. "Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 435-457, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0811. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kostis Pigounakis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.