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International Cooperation over Green Taxes: On the Impossibility of Achieving a Probability-One Gain

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  • Thomas Aronsson
  • Kenneth Backlund
  • Karl-Gustav Löfgren

Abstract

This paper concerns international coordination of environmental taxation. The main contribution of the paper is to provide a frame-work for dynamic cost benefit analysis of environmental tax reforms in a global economy with transboundary environmental problems. We show that the welfare effects of green tax reform in a multi-country economy may differ substantially from earlier results associated with representative agent models, where the transboundary aspect of the environmental problems is neglected.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Aronsson & Kenneth Backlund & Karl-Gustav Löfgren, 2001. "International Cooperation over Green Taxes: On the Impossibility of Achieving a Probability-One Gain," CESifo Working Paper Series 567, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_567
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    References listed on IDEAS

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